New Geopolitics of the South Caucasus: Consequences of the Washington Agreements

Author: Namik Aliyev, Doctor of Law, Professor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Head of the Department at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

The Washington summit on August 8, 2025, between Armenia and Azerbaijan under the auspices of the United States was not just a step toward ending one of the most protracted post-Soviet conflicts. It marked the beginning of a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, reshaping the balance of power, interests, and influence in the region.

The United States Returns to the Regional Game

By mediating the signing of the peace declaration and the TRIPP infrastructure agreement, Washington effectively seized the initiative from traditional players — Russia and France. This demonstrated not only diplomatic ambition but also geo-economic pragmatism.

The United States secured 99-year concessionary control over a strategic transport route (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. For the first time in decades, American companies affiliated with the energy, telecommunications, and construction sectors will gain direct access to investments in the South Caucasus’ strategic infrastructure. The agreements include elements of economic dependence on the U.S. for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, creating a new and sustainable lever of influence as an alternative to Russia’s military and energy presence.

Thus, Washington is moving from observer to architect of the region’s political order. The presidents of Azerbaijan and the United States signed a “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the United States of America on the Establishment of a Strategic Working Group with the aim of preparing a Charter on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United States of America,” intended to elevate bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. A new stage in Azerbaijan-U.S. relations has begun.

Russia — Loss of Mediating Monopoly

For the past 30 years, Russia’s role in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict had been decisive. However, since 2022 and the start of the war in Ukraine, its resources have been overstretched and Yerevan’s trust has eroded. As a result, Russia has been pushed out of the key peace process:

• The dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group — in which Russia was a co-chair — effectively ended its institutional presence in the negotiations.
• The agreement does not include the participation of the CSTO, Russia’s Foreign Ministry, or peacekeeping structures under Russian command.
• Moscow expressed “concern” over TRIPP, which could undermine its plans for Eurasian transport integration (particularly the “North–South” project through Iran and Armenia).

Russian influence remains at the level of media, certain political actors, and part of the Armenian opposition, but its real levers have been reduced to a minimum.

Iran: Defining Its Position

The day after the Washington summit, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Iran welcomed the initialing of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to the statement, Iran sees this agreement as an important step toward establishing lasting peace in the region. Iran is ready to continue constructive cooperation with both Azerbaijan and Armenia to maintain peace and stability, and to promote economic development in the region through bilateral and regional cooperation. The statement also noted that restoring communication links will contribute to the stability, security, and economic development of the region’s countries.

At the same time, Iran “expresses concern about the negative consequences of any foreign interference, especially near its shared borders, which undermines security and long-term stability in the region.”

Earlier statements from Iran had identified the emergence of a Western corridor through Zangezur as a red line, since it:

1. Reduced Iran’s transit role as a link between Azerbaijan and Turkey;
2. Increased the risk of expanding American military and technological presence near Iran’s northern border;
3. Reduced opportunities for implementing China–Iran logistics projects tied to the Belt and Road Initiative.

On the eve of the summit, Tehran had spoken of “undermining regional stability” and “outside interference,” but no official steps were taken. Overall, the Foreign Ministry’s statement should be seen as a positive signal.

Turkey as a Strategic Beneficiary

Ankara gains indirect but steady benefits from the agreements, expressed in:

1. The “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) strengthens the transport link between Azerbaijan and Turkey through Nakhchivan, supporting the idea of the “Turan Corridor”;
2. Azerbaijan enhances its position as an energy and logistics partner, including for gas supplies to Europe bypassing Russia and Iran;
3. Armenia, previously oriented toward Moscow and Tehran, is forced to move toward normalization with Ankara to balance influences.

Formally, Turkey did not participate in the Washington summit, but its geopolitical presence is felt through Azerbaijan’s strengthened position and the logistical importance of transit toward Europe.

EU and China: Restrained Reaction

The European Union, which had previously mediated in Brussels (Michel, Macron), received the Washington summit with restraint but without conflict. The EU welcomes the end of the conflict but is concerned about the absence of humanitarian guarantees and the role of European institutions.

In a joint statement by European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen regarding the initialing of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the declaration between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in Washington, the importance of ensuring the timely implementation of agreed steps to guarantee sustainable and continuous progress toward full normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan was emphasized.

China is among the indirect losers. Beijing’s influence in the region is built on transit corridors and infrastructure loans. If TRIPP becomes an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative in the South Caucasus, it will alter routes and flows, reducing transit value through Iran.

Global Consequences: The End of the Post-Soviet Model

The Washington summit symbolizes not just the signing of documents but the abandonment of the post-Soviet conflict resolution model, based on:

1. Multilateral forums (OSCE, CSTO);
2. Moscow’s patronage;
3. The moral right of the “war victor” to dictate terms.

The new model is based on bilateral diplomacy involving the U.S., uses economic and infrastructure levers instead of military threats, and creates a competitive environment among global players in local politics.

In Conclusion…

The United States returns to the region, strengthening its role and influence, and gains economic and political dividends. Azerbaijan wins geopolitically, reducing pressure and gaining advantageous transit while diversifying existing communications. Armenia achieves some diplomatic easing of isolation but retains internal risks and contradictions. Russia loses influence and its mediator role in the South Caucasus. In Iran, anxiety grows along with a sense of geopolitical encirclement. Turkey gains indirect regional influence through its ally.

The Washington summit is not just an agreement between two post-Soviet republics. It is a reset of the entire strategy of external influence in the South Caucasus. The only question is whether this peace can be sustained and made durable.